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Abstract (98 words) 
Much attention has been given to financial conflicts of interest (COI) in bioscience 
research. Yet to date, surprisingly little attention has focused on other COIs that arise in 
supervisor-student relations. We examine a spectrum of related situations, ranging from 
standard graduate supervision through to dual relationships sometimes found in 
research with commercial potential. We illustrate some of the less-obvious factors that 
can bias supervisory judgment, and situate financial COI along a spectrum of forces that 
are deserving of recognition. We conclude by providing two sets of recommendations: 
one for individual supervisors, and the other for institutions and policy-makers. 
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Introduction 
In the biomedical sciences, close interactions between academic and commercial 
entities are commonplace. Funds from pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies 
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have helped finance major bioscience projects and research centres, graduate students 
are receiving training in commercial laboratories, and university scientists are translating 
their intellectual property by patenting and licensing their research or launching start-up 
companies. Such interactions have received the blessing of universities and local and 
national governments (Bok 2003; Benner and Sandstrom 2000). But concerns have 
also been raised about the ethical challenges posed by university-industry relations, 
especially with regards to academic liberty and conflict of interest (COI) in the context of 
dual loyalties (e.g., researcher’s duties towards their departments and industry partners) 
(Lewis et al. 2001; Triggle 2004). 
 
In university contexts, COIs are often seen as being primarily an issue for biomedical 
researchers. Particular attention has been given to the influence that receiving 
consultation or patient-recruitment fees, or having shares in biotechnology or 
pharmaceutical companies supporting clinical trials, can have on medical judgment, 
patient safety in biomedical research, and the function of medical schools (Cohen 2002; 
Schafer 2004). Concern extends more generally to the publication of scientific research 
in peer-reviewed journals, and the need for transparency and declaration of competing 
interests on the part of researchers and institutions (Krimsky et al. 1999; Stein 2004; 
ICMJE 2007). Much less well studied, however, is the relationship between university 
professors or faculty-level researchers – specifically laboratory directors working in the 
biosciences – and their students, or the particular case wherein the researcher is also a 
director or head of a start-up company and the student is also their employee. In both 
situations, there is arguably a “dual relationship” that can lead to important conflicts 
(Sugarman 2005); unfortunately, university regulations (including COI policies) are 
rarely equipped to deal with this particular issue (Cho et al. 2000; Doutriaux, Padmore, 
and Schuetze 2003). 
 
In this paper we examine a spectrum of related situations, ranging from standard, 
relatively uncomplicated graduate supervision, through to the dual relationships 
sometimes found in research with clear commercial potential. We argue that ethical 
challenges across this spectrum include not just conflicts of interest, but also conflicts of 
obligation. Further, we argue that the particularly challenging conflicts that occur with 
regard to commercial ventures – and about which so much concern has been 
expressed in the literature (Campbell et al. 2007; Bouchard and Lemmens 2008; Parks 
and Disis 2004) – are best understood as part of the larger spectrum of challenges that 
inevitably arise when complex organizational structures are devised to meet complex 
human interests and needs. 
 
In order to give readers unfamiliar with laboratory environments a better sense of the 
context we are discussing, we will first sketch the characteristics typical of a university-
based research laboratory. 
 
The Laboratory Environment 
Academic bioscience laboratories are team-based research and teaching environments, 
based in fundamental or applied science departments such as biology, biochemistry or 
medical genetics. A small lab may have 5-10 members, while a big lab could have 12 or 
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more (some as big as 70 members). Labs are hierarchical in organization and are 
directed by a faculty member (the lab director) who funds the research activities out of 
research grants. The director supervises research associates (in the bigger labs), post-
doctoral fellows (“post-docs”), technicians and graduate students. Post-docs manage 
their own projects and may occasionally (more commonly in the United States) have an 
undergraduate student or a technician working with them. Research assistants and/or 
technicians will work directly under the director or under a research associate. Graduate 
students will often have undergraduate students to supervise. 
 
In North America, funding for university bioscience research is obtained primarily 
through peer-reviewed grants from government science councils (e.g., the US National 
Institutes of Health and National Science Foundation, or the Canadian Institutes of 
Health Research). Operating funds can also be derived from charitable foundations and 
industry sources. These resources are used primarily to purchase research equipment 
and pay salaries. The employees in a lab include technicians, research assistants 
(graduate students or individuals with graduate degrees), post-docs and research 
associates. Unless otherwise supported by external scholarships, students and post-
doctoral fellows are paid salaries from their lab director’s operating funds to conduct 
research while working to obtain their degrees, i.e., they are quasi-employees but 
usually without contracts or employment benefits. Graduate students may also be 
involved in a diversity of more formal employment relations. They may do other work 
within the university, perhaps as a Teaching Assistant or Exam Invigilator, Alternatively, 
they may work as contractors or consultants for industry-sponsored research projects, 
or even as part/full-time employees in spin-off companies. Students sometimes also 
conduct the research component of their graduate studies within industry laboratories 
with which their supervisors have ties, whether or not they are also employees of the 
company. 
 
The members of a lab work to further the director’s particular research agenda; the work 
they do will also contribute to their individual graduate theses (which may constitute 
focused sub-projects, part of the larger research program), academic presentations and 
publications. Students work closely with their senior colleagues to learn the practical 
and theoretical skills necessary to conduct experimental research. In bigger labs, 
students often will interact more frequently with a senior student or post-doctoral fellow 
than they will with their lab director, who is their official departmental supervisor and 
responsible for their academic progression; in smaller labs, the students are more often 
directly supervised by the lab director. 
 
Laboratories rely on close working relationships: parts of or the whole team will be 
actively involved in developing and testing ideas, running experiments, and contributing 
to the production of research results in the form of posters or presentations at national 
or international meetings, and peer-reviewed publications. In many fields of bioscience, 
research and publication are highly competitive; a number of labs may be working on 
the same research question and racing to be the first to present or publish a scientific 
discovery. Thus the training and retention of capable graduate students and research 
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staff, as well as the protection of research confidentiality (until publication), will be 
important issues for a lab director. 
 
Academic bioscience laboratories sometimes make discoveries or develop technologies 
that have potential commercial value. Patents may be sought in order to license the 
product to biotechnology or pharmaceutical companies for further development and 
commercialization, or to be licensed to other laboratories in the case of scientific 
research tools. On occasion, a discovery or technology may be sufficiently promising 
that the director considers starting a spin-off company to commercialize the discovery. 
This decision is not taken lightly or alone; it necessarily involves extensive discussions 
between the lab director and the university technology transfer office (including lawyers 
and patent officers), to evaluate the patentability of the discovery, the value of the 
intellectual property, and the availability of venture capital, among other factors.  
 
Of course, not all academics will have the requisite management skills or 
entrepreneurial ability to develop and grow a successful spin-off company and become 
‘merchant scientists.’ Most will continue to pursue their basic or applied research in the 
university environment (Atkinson-Grosjean 2006). In other words, despite the political 
rhetoric about universities becoming entrepreneurial institutions, many bioscientists still 
have little interest in commercialization or the development of spin-off companies. That 
being said, they (and their graduate students) may be supported by and work with 
industry partners, conduct contract research or consult for companies. 
 
The subset of researchers interested in setting up a spin-off company may be attracted 
by the opportunity for personal gain in terms of academic prestige and financial 
rewards, as well as by closer ties with other private companies that may eventually help 
fund other aspects of the lab director’s research program. A spin-off company may also 
be seen as a means of making practical contributions to the advancement of science 
and the development of new and useful products (especially diagnostic tests and 
medicines) that will benefit patients and society at large (Shane 2004). Spin-offs from 
academic laboratories will often be located at private research labs, which may share 
space and facilities with the academic lab; alternatively they may be physically 
separated and housed nearby or at an off-campus university science park. 
 
Life in a spin-off company imposes demands on the time and freedom of university-
based researchers. A university researcher entering that world will have to consider 
managerial issues, such as which employees to hire (including not just research staff 
but also clerical and administrative staff) and how to separate their university research 
activities from those of the company. (Some universities have explicit policies to guide 
such activities (Cho et al. 2000)). In addition, such researchers will often have to 
become accustomed to spending long hours seeking out venture capital to support their 
commercial research, and planning the production and protection of the company’s 
intellectual property. The researcher/director of a new spin-off will have to closely 
evaluate their capacity and willingness to take on the full responsibilities of leading the 
company. As companies, grow, some researchers will choose – often under pressure 
from investors or the company’s board of directors – to hire a manager experienced with 
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biotech spin-offs to take over as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO); the researcher then 
in turn may become the Chief Scientific Officer (CSO) and focus on charting the 
scientific direction or priorities for the company, a role more closely fitting their academic 
training and expertise (Jousma and Scholten 2007). This can be a difficult decision for 
the researcher to make, because it involves handing over a significant degree of control 
of the scientific project to non-scientific experts. At this point, the researcher may shift 
their focus back to the university environment (while maintaining links with the company 
and, for example, conducting contract research), or leave the company altogether 
(although they may retain stocks or stock options in the company). 
 
Having sketched the environment of university and commercial labs, we can now begin 
our exploration of some of the central ethical challenges raised in graduate student 
supervision in the biosciences. 
 
Three Kinds of Supervisory Relationships 
Supervisory relationships come in many shapes, and vary significantly in their form and 
complexity. We next sketch three very rough categories of supervisory relationships, 
pointing out the kinds of conflicting obligations and potential COIs that may be found in 
each. Our aim is to illustrate the range of conflicts that can occur along this spectrum of 
supervisory relationships. 
 
1. Graduate supervision 
The simplest relevant relationship, namely the straightforward supervision of a graduate 
student by a university professor, is uncomplicated by any commercial interests or 
relationships. Yet it is important to note that even such straightforward supervisory 
relationships involve inherent COIs. Supervision requires the exercise of judgment on 
the part of the supervisor. University and Departmental regulations notwithstanding, 
supervisors must normally exercise judgment in deciding the type and quantity of work 
to assign to students, in devising grading schemes, in evaluating student work, and in 
writing letters of recommendation. Supervisors must also exercise judgment regarding 
the type and quantity of supervisory activity: the number of hours of contact time 
granted to a supervisee is a crucial variable. Since students are typically unable (partly 
because they are unqualified) to judge in a precise way the quality of supervision, 
supervisory judgment is typically exercised with considerable leeway. This suggests that 
the supervisory relationship is, at heart, a fiduciary – that is, trust-based – relationship 
(Sugarman 2005). 
 
Further, supervisors always have other obligations and interests that stand in tension 
with the demands of supervision. To begin with, university professors typically have a 
range of professional obligations other than graduate supervision. These obligations 
include teaching courses, engaging in scholarly research, and serving on university 
committees. Professors may also have obligations rooted in roles they play beyond the 
walls of the university: obligations to family, and to their religious or cultural 
communities, and obligations of citizenship. In addition to competing obligations, they 
also naturally have a range of interests that may conflict with supervisory obligations. 
For example, professors typically have a natural (and reasonable) interest in leisure and 
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hobbies, in career advancement, in making a substantive contribution to their fields, and 
in having their students succeed in ways that reflect well on them as supervisors. 
 
We see already, then, in simple supervisory relationships, the ingredients of a classic 
COI. A COI is any situation in which an individual is in a role requiring them to exercise 
judgment in the service of some other individual or institution, and in which they have 
some interest that stands to make it harder for them to exercise that judgment 
objectively. Professors, in their role as graduate supervisors, are expected to exercise 
judgment in the educating and mentoring of graduate students; any interest they may 
have in anything other than the student’s education and training puts the supervisor in a 
conflict of interest. Of course, many such conflicts are unavoidable, since every 
professor has multiple interests. All we can expect of professors in supervisory roles is 
that they do their best to recognize factors that may bias their judgment, and do what 
they can to minimize their effect. 
 
It is worth noting just how hard it is to distinguish cleanly – within the class of things that 
might bias a graduate supervisor’s judgment – between a professor’s obligations on the 
one hand, and their interests on the other. For example, a professor’s interest in career 
advancement may inspire him or her to do more than the minimum expected, in terms 
of the obligation (often written into academic contracts) to engage in scholarly research. 
And the question of whether to call the act of attending to the needs of one’s family a 
matter of ‘obligation’ or a matter of ‘interest’ is a complicated one: some at least will 
define one’s ‘interests’ broadly enough to include the interests of those one cares about, 
and to whom one also doubtless has obligations. Thus even the simplest of supervisory 
relationships raise questions of conflict, though hopefully not insurmountable ones. 
 
2. Supervision plus employment of graduate students 
We move now to a second, somewhat more complicated scenario, namely one in which 
a professor supervises a graduate student, while at the same time employing that 
student as a research assistant in their lab or as a teaching assistant for their courses. 
Supervisory relationships of this kind retain the complexity manifested by the ‘simpler’ 
relationships described in the previous paragraphs. But they also bring additional 
worries, because such relationships are in fact subject to two different normative 
regimes, namely one set designed to govern supervisory relationships, and a separate 
set designed to govern employment relationships. 
 
Following Davis (Davis 1999) we take the norms governing supervisory relationships to 
be, like the norms governing relations with students more generally, a combination of 
two sets of norms governing university professors. One is the set of institutional norms 
governing ‘the academy,’ which is in essence the name given to the shared enterprise 
engaged in by professors, students and university administrators. The other is the set of 
norms constituting the professional ethics of the professoriate. (A full explanation of the 
overlap and differences between those two sets of norms is beyond the scope of this 
paper.) 
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The relationship between supervisors and graduate students is best characterized as a 
fiduciary relationship: imbalances of knowledge and power mean that the student must 
trust that the supervisor will conscientiously provide reasonably high-quality education 
and mentoring. Though the professor’s student (unlike, perhaps, the physician’s patient) 
is not best thought of as helpless, the inability of the student to assess anything more 
than the most superficial aspects of the professor’s performance of their supervisory 
duties means that professors must be trusted. In particular, we need to be able to trust 
that students won’t be exploited for their supervisor’s gain. Hence, professors must (and 
generally do) understand themselves to be obligated to be more diligent in tending to 
the interests of their supervisees than would be the case if their relationship with 
supervisees were a simple contractual relationship between consenting individuals. 
 
The objectives of graduate supervision – the ends towards which the norms governing 
such relationships provide guidance – are relatively clear. The most obvious goal is to 
help the student acquire the knowledge and independent research skills suitable to their 
academic discipline. In the biosciences, supervision also typically involves mentoring 
aimed at helping prepare the student for the transition into the workplace: depending on 
the student’s goals, this may involve learning a combination of hands-on laboratory 
procedures and conceptual research skills, as well as professional skills related to 
disseminating research results through conference presentations and scholarly 
publications. 
 
All of this, of course, is constrained by the norms of both science and academia. 
Academic norms require that students be evaluated fairly and objectively. Both scientific 
and academic norms support the idea that what the supervisor is helping the student to 
learn is how best to pursue knowledge as an independent scholar. Supervisory ethics, 
therefore, requires that the supervisor seek what is in the student’s best (academic) 
interests, subject to the limits posed by standards of academic quality and scientific 
integrity. It is also worth noting that the norms governing supervision of graduate 
students are largely unwritten and effectively unenforced. University and departmental 
guidelines may provide a certain amount of guidance, and some students might indeed 
look up to them for some indication of what their supervisors’ obligations are. But the 
guidance provided by such documents is likely to be very loose, and a supervisor could 
easily follow their letter without adhering to their spirit. 
 
In this second category of supervisory relationships (i.e., dual supervisory-employment 
relationships), another set of norms is relevant, namely the set of norms governing 
employment. The norms governing relations between employers (or managers) and 
employees are quite different, even within university settings, from those governing the 
supervision of students. Employment relations are fundamentally contractual: the 
employee exchanges labour (i.e., the application of physical and/or mental effort to the 
employer’s projects) in return for some form of remuneration (primarily consisting of a 
wage or salary). Thus the primary obligation of an employer is to live up to both the 
letter and the spirit of the employment contract, in pursuit of the production of some 
external good (some product, service, or in this case scientific discovery). The norms 
governing employment can easily conflict with the norms governing supervision. The 
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conditions under which a relationship may be terminated provide a good example. A 
supervisor should, other things being equal, retain a student as supervisee until that 
student’s degree or project is finished1; an employer is obligated only to retain an 
employee until the employment contract runs out, or in the absence of a contract, until 
the employee’s services no longer serve the employer’s needs. 
 
We thus see potential for both conflict of interest and conflict of obligations, with the 
additional complexity of two competing sets of regulatory norms. In a complex 
relationship, a single individual, acting as both employer and supervisor, can have two 
or more divergent obligations at the same moment. 
 
3. Supervisory-employment relationships and commercial research 
We move now to discuss the third type of relationship within our proposed spectrum, 
namely dual supervisory-employment relationships that take place specifically within 
university research labs doing work with clear commercial potential. 
 
Such settings are subject to all of the worries associated with the previous two 
categories, but are in addition subject to a further set of worries, including worries 
closely linked to those that have spurred criticisms of university-industry relationships. 
Such worries spring, of course, from concerns about the influence of the profit motive. 
The key worry is that the possibility that research might turn profitable puts professors, 
who are in supervisory roles over students working in their research labs, in a serious 
COI. For example, it is possible that the profit motive could affect a professor’s 
supervisory advice. Although we know of no solid empirical evidence, the ‘folk 
hypothesis’ is that money is a particularly potent source of bias.2 In particular, the worry 
is that a professor with commercial interests might give biased advice on choice of 
thesis topic: a student might be pushed towards a topic that will contribute to valuable, 
patentable discoveries (for which the professor is more likely than the student to get 
credit) rather than a topic that will result in publishable findings that will advance the 
student’s career. Similarly, advice on the timing of graduation might be influenced by 
their interest in having the student contribute to potentially-profitable research.  
 
It is worth noting that this category – “university labs doing work with commercial 
potential” – is somewhat amorphous: it may be hard to recognize, from the outside, labs 
that are doing work with commercial potential. But most if not all biomedical laboratories 
conduct work that has, at least, commercial potential of some sort, even if their work is 
not likely to result in the development of a blockbuster pharmaceutical. And to a certain 
extent, what matters in terms of the issues discussed here is not whether the research 
being done has commercial potential, but whether the professor supervising the lab 
believes that the research has commercial potential. This difficulty in identifying, from 
the outside, labs that fit this category need not stop us from analysing the relevant 
                                                 
1 In some institutions, the supervisor may even have an obligation to see a student through to completion, 
or abandonment of the degree; in contrast, a student is usually free to change supervisors at their 
discretion.  
2 In fact, there is some empirical evidence to the contrary. See, for example (Moore et al. 2003) 
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problems. It may pose a serious challenge, however, in implementing institutional 
remedies. 
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Table 1: Sources of conflict across the spectrum of supervisory relationships 
  Type of Relationship 
  
Supervision 
Supervision 
plus 
Employment 
Supervision 
plus 
Employment in 
Commercial 
Context 
Conflict of Interest    
Conflict of Obligations    
Conflict of Normative 
Frameworks    
Ty
pe
 o
f 
C
on
fli
ct
 
Significant Financial 
Conflict    
 
3.1 CEO (supervisor?) and employee (student?) relations in the spin-off 
A particularly challenging case in our third category of relationships is the dual 
relationships that obtain when a professor becomes head or CSO of a fully commercial 
research lab at a spin-off company, and one or more graduate students takes on a 
second role as an employee at that company. It is difficult to locate reliable statistics on 
how common such dual relationships are, but they do occur. Such situations involve all 
of the tensions and risks of the three categories outlined above: conflicts of interest (will 
the professor in such a situation give unbiased advice to her supervisees?), conflicts of 
obligation (will the professor/entrepreneur prioritize obligations to students, or 
obligations to family?), conflicting normative regimes (will student-employees be treated 
as students, or as employees?), and the potentially COI-exacerbating effect of the profit 
motive. But there is at least one additional set of worries, namely those that spring from 
the fact that managers in private industry are generally regarded as having fiduciary 
obligations to owners, investors, and shareholders – fiduciary obligations that stand in 
tension with the fiduciary obligations that professors owe to their students. 
 
In the private sector, the organization (i.e., a firm) that results from various employment 
contracts is typically one that is fundamentally hierarchical, and best characterized by 
the ethico-legal concept of agency. In an agency relationship, the agent (here, the 
employee) is engaged to perform a task that the principal (here, the employer) lacks 
either the time or the skill to perform. In an agency relationship, the primary obligation of 
the agent (i.e., employee) is to diligently pursue the legitimate interests of the principal. 
 
Of course, in all but the smallest firms (e.g., start-up biotech companies that may initially 
consist of only a handful of employees), the agency relationship is actually multi-layered 
(Buchanan 1996): rather than being an agent of the employer, the employee is best 
seen as an agent of his or her immediate superior, or manager, and the manager is 
typically an agent in turn for someone at the next step up the organizational hierarchy. 
With the exception of very small companies (where the manager may also be the 
owner), managers typically manage on behalf of someone else, whether it be an owner, 
a small group of investors, or a diverse set of shareholders. 
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Thus while the employee is in an agency relationship with the manager and hence owes 
certain obligations of loyalty, the manager is also typically – and importantly – in an 
agency relationship with the owners of the company, and so is obligated to pursue the 
owners’ legitimate interests. This obligation to the company’s owners does imply 
something about how employees are treated: the owners have obligations to treat 
employees fairly, and that obligation must be carried out by managers as the owners 
agents. But the fact that managers act as agents for owners also implies a limit on the 
obligations owed by managers to employees. So, for example, a manager’s obligation 
to train and mentor an employee are strictly limited to the forms of training and 
mentoring that are conducive to (and cost-effective in pursuing) the interests of the 
company. And in carrying out wage negotiations on behalf of owners, managers – while 
bound by basic rules of honesty and the injunction to bargain in good faith – are 
generally obligated to pursue the interests of the company’s owners, rather than the 
interests of employees. 
 
It is clear, then, that employment relationships in business firms are governed by norms 
quite different from those that govern university supervisor-student relationships. The 
fact that people in managerial positions may be subject to a range of different role-
related norms (including potentially conflicting fiduciary obligations) is a central problem 
of management ethics (Buchanan 1996), and many organizations devote considerable 
energies to establishing policies and informal norms to guide managers through such 
conflicts. But the conflict becomes perhaps even more critical when a single individual 
(e.g., the academic entrepreneur) is subject to two different sets of normative 
constraints with regard to their relationship with a single stakeholder. To summarise, the 
academic entrepreneur is subject to two different normative regimes: one that requires 
faithful attention to the educational needs of the student, and one that requires faithful 
attention to the needs of the owners of the business and that may put significant limits 
on their ability to do things that benefit employees. When the student and the employee 
are one person, the conflict is obvious.  
 
Discussion 
The distinction between supervisory relationships and employment relationships is not 
crisp: after all, many students (across the range of academic disciplines) are paid to 
work as evaluators in the grading of student assignments (i.e., as teaching assistants), 
or as lab assistants, research assistants, and so on. But the situation of such student-
employees differs in a number of significant ways from the situation of employees in the 
private sector. Indeed, the differences are more instructive than the similarities. To 
begin with, in standard employment relationships, the level of remuneration is driven by 
the market: rare and useful skills are handsomely rewarded, while common and less-
useful skills are often paid at a rate at or near the legislated minimum. In academic 
settings, on the other hand, many student jobs are seen as (among other things) forms 
of student funding, and the rate of remuneration may in some instances be set 
implausibly high relative to the value of the work performed; this is particularly the case 
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in the humanities and social sciences (especially when there are also collective 
agreements for teaching and research assistants).3  
 
It is worth looking at the complex situation we are describing from the student-
employee’s point of view. As we mentioned above, in academic bioscience laboratories, 
when students do not have their own funding from scholarships, they are invariably paid 
a salary from the lab director’s operating funds. Laboratory research cultures vary 
significantly, but in general students are expected to spend a minimum of 40 hours per 
week physically in the lab at their bench conducting experiments; many lab directors will 
require 70 hours per week or more. Since the director controls the salaries (although 
granting agencies or departments often set minimum levels of support), they can 
provide or at least promise bonuses or raises to students. Even a very small hourly 
raise or a top-up to a scholarship can be used to entice students to finish a project 
faster, work longer hours (including nights and weekends), and so on. But as students, 
they lack the benefits that usually come with employment in a company (e.g., vacation 
time, medical benefits). On the other hand, unlike most regular employees, students 
may benefit from the prestige of being first (or co-) author on articles, may get funded to 
travel to and present at national and international conferences, and are often paid to 
conduct research for which they will receive academic degrees. 
  
The essence of the problem is that the researcher’s interests, as manifested in an 
employment relation with the student (whether this is as lab director or as the head of a 
spin-off company), may impinge upon their ability to supervise and serve as a mentor 
for the student in a way that is in the student’s best interest. The notion of COI looks 
quite different in light of these two sets of norms (i.e., the norms surrounding 
supervision, on one hand, and employment, on the other). In a context that brings these 
two sets of norms together, COI is a significant threat. In a straight employment 
relationship with its contractual obligations, the (partial) conflict between the interests of 
employers and employees is so blatant that it often is not even called COI.  
 
It is worth enumerating some of ways in which the range of influences on supervisors’ 
judgment can manifest themselves. Biasing influences on the supervisor-student 
relationship might show up as: 
• Reduced quality and quantity of student advising; 
• Biased thesis advice (e.g., regarding whether to continue the project or stop and 
join the company); 
• Biased advice regarding timing of student-led publication (e.g., delaying 
submission for publication in order to protect commercially valuable 
discoveries4); 
                                                 
3 Levels of remuneration for student work vary enormously across universities and disciplines. But for at 
least some work – such as grading multiple-choice tests, or photocopying – students are almost always 
paid significantly more than the wage (probably near the legal minimum wage) that such work would 
demand outside of a university. 
4 Students are often involved in the patenting process, including making patentable discoveries. Some 
universities in Canada have provisions in their thesis submission guidelines that allow for a student to 
delay (e.g., by one year) the publication of their thesis in the national library system, in order to protect 
potential IP or important, publishable information that might be stolen by a competitor. 
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• Moves to delay graduation to keep talent around (rumoured to be common in 
academic labs); 
• Biased advice on choice of research topics (commercial vs. interest-driven); 
• Biased career advice (e.g., whether to pursue a post-doctoral position and an 
academic career path, or to join the company). 
 
With regard to each of these issues, supervisors face a conflict of interest: their interests 
as academic lab directors, and as researchers with commercial partners, threaten to 
influence the advice they give to their supervisees. This is not to say, however, that all 
supervisors, or those who become company directors and who employ their students in 
biotech start-ups, necessarily create or encounter unmanageable COIs. Our point is that 
the supervisor-student relationship in bioscience labs is inherently complex, a mix of 
often conflicting responsibilities and loyalties which is further exacerbated when the 
supervisor becomes a ‘merchant scientist’ and the student an employee of the 
company. 
 
It is worth emphasizing that the simple fact of being in a COI does not imply that one 
has done something unethical – the issue is how to handle the situation. (MacDonald, 
McDonald, and Norman 2002; Davis and Stark 2001). The standard advice is roughly to 
1) avoid COIs when possible; 2) disclose the interest to all concerned; and 3) remove 
oneself from sensitive decisions where feasible. Sometimes 1 and 3 are impossible so 2 
(transparency) becomes crucial. But this standard advice may be insufficient. Some 
guidance can come from ethics (including COI) policies and guidelines, but these vary 
enormously between universities, are sometimes poorly written and poorly disseminated 
(Smith and Williams-Jones in press; Williams-Jones and MacDonald 2008) and often do 
not specifically address supervisor-student relations (Cho et al. 2000).  
 
Recommendations 
In this paper, we have attempted to illustrate the wide range of influences that can 
impinge upon the appropriate exercise of supervisory judgment in graduate educational 
settings, and in particular in bioscience laboratories. Our goals here have been twofold. 
On one hand, we have sought to shine a light on some of the less-obvious (or less-
frequently-acknowledged) factors that stand to bias supervisory judgment. On the other 
hand, in so doing, we have sought to situate financial conflicts of interest along a 
spectrum of forces – some relatively benign, some malignant; some avoidable, some 
unavoidable – all of which are deserving of recognition and analysis. Though our main 
goal here has been descriptive and analytic, we see our analysis as pointing to two 
rough sets of recommendations: one aimed at individual supervisors, and the other 
aimed at institutions and institutional policy-makers. 
 
Advice for Individual Supervisors 
There are limits to how much can be accomplished by focusing on individual behaviour, 
motives, and integrity. As argued at length by Norman and MacDonald (2009), it is 
becoming increasingly clear that conflict of interest (and the related problems discussed 
above) is best thought of as a specifically institutional problem: we generally worry 
about COI not (merely) because it affects individuals (e.g., students) but because it 
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jeopardizes the mission of entire institutions – be they professions, corporations, 
charities or universities – and jeopardizes the public’s faith in them. Thinking even more 
broadly, COI in bioscience labs can undermine science itself by jeopardizing the 
mentoring relationships upon which science depends (Shamoo and Resnik 2009). Such 
being the case, situations in which individual supervisory judgment seems liable to be 
biased by inappropriate forces are not best dealt with through appeals to individuals to 
behave appropriately. The reputations of institutions can be damaged by COI, or the 
appearance of COI, “even when the individual at the centre of the perceived conflict is in 
fact of unflinching integrity” and has acted entirely appropriately (MacDonald, 
McDonald, and Norman 2002, 73). Nonetheless, the behaviour of individual supervisors 
does have a very direct effect on the lives of supervisees, so a few words of advice are 
appropriate. We offer the following four suggestions: 
 
1. Supervisors should recognize and guard against the full range of factors that 
might bias the teaching, advising, and mentoring of their students. The fact that 
institutional policies may focus on financial conflicts of interest does not excuse 
turning a blind eye to other, perhaps equally biasing, factors. 
2. Supervisors should go beyond a vague commitment to “guard against” COI. As 
educators, they know that “trying harder” is a poor plan. That is true whether it be 
a student’s aspiration to “try harder next term” or a supervisor’s intention to keep 
her professional judgment free of bias. We recommend instead an explicit, 
written self-audit. 
3. Supervisors should educate themselves about what the “standard” biasing 
factors are (many of which are discussed above) and give careful consideration 
to whether, and how, their own behaviour falls prey to, or avoids, those sources 
of bias. 
4. Supervisors should talk openly about COI with their supervisees – both in the 
abstract, and with regard to particular, concrete COIs. This is an important part of 
the mentoring process, part of helping advisees learn to recognize and deal 
appropriately with COI as it arises in their own careers.5 Talking openly about 
COI is also a good way of reflecting the fact (noted above) that to find oneself in 
a COI is not in itself blameworthy: it is an ethical challenge to be understood and 
mitigated, and from which lessons can be learned. 
 
Advice for Institutions 
We offer the following four recommendations for institutions, in addition to policies 
already in place for the disclosing and limiting of financial COI. For some of these 
recommendations, whether it is best implemented by individual labs, departments, or 
entire universities will depend on various organizational factors, including size, 
interdisciplinarity, and so on. 
 
1. Institutions should develop clear guidelines (where these are not already present) 
regarding such things as appropriate workload and remuneration for graduate 
                                                 
5 On the importance of ethics training more generally for bioscience students and faculty, see Eisen and 
Berry, 2002. 
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students and post-docs working in bioscience labs and appropriate time-to-
completion for graduate degrees. 
2. Institutions should foster open discussion both of the requirements of good 
mentoring, and the dangers and varieties of COI. The National Academy of 
Sciences suggests, for example, that institutions “[s]ponsor more discussions of 
topics relevant to mentoring, such as professional standards [and] ethical 
values….” (National Academy of Sciences 1997, 67) 
3. Institutions should foster a process of self-evaluation or self-audit on the part of 
professors involved in graduate supervision, regarding the full range of factors 
known to be liable to corrupt supervisory judgment. What ever their particular 
format, the goal of such exercises should be explicitly and emphatically to assist 
supervisors in self-monitoring, rather than to facilitate greater external scrutiny. 
4. Technology transfer offices should implement policies regarding the treatment of 
students whose graduate research is being done in whole or in part in 
commercial labs, and regarding limitations on spin-off companies recruiting 
students prior to the completion of their degrees. We do not have a clear vision of 
what such policies should look like, but we are certain that such policies, and the 
multi-stakeholder discussions that ought to inform them, would be useful. 
 
It is critical to acknowledge the different and sometimes conflicting values and 
objectives of academia and industry, and the concomitant professional roles and 
responsibilities of supervisors and start-up owner-managers. It is our contention that 
such relations, and the associated conflicts of interest, are in need of explicit attention 
from researchers, students, university administrators and industry partners. 
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